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Abstract
This paper describes the important changes that occurred in the U.S. grain handling and
transportation system in the period following deregulation in 1980. This system has evolved and will
continue to do so in response to technological and institutional changes, competitive pressures and
a changed regulatory regime. The effect has been to induce investments throughout the system
ultimately to improve the efficiency. Some of the important rail innovations include the use of rate
discounts to induce more efficient movements from origins first, and more recently at destinations.
In addition, each railroad has adopted car allocation systems comprising of several mechanisms,
giving shippers logistical choices which have also facilitated more efficient allocation of cars among
shippers. Finally, a number of important implications for the Canadian industry are identified as it
evolves through its forthcoming changes.
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The grain handling and transportation system in the upper Midwest has changed
dramatically over the past two decades.  There have been technological changes and productivity
gains in rail operations, handling and shipping and substantial investment throughout the system. 
These changes were triggered in part by changes in the regulatory mechanisms that were adopted
in 1980.  However, other important factors have also contributed. These include underlying
economies of scale in rail operations, handling and logistics management, as well as service
competition.  In addition, the competitive environment in the handling and railroad sectors is
sufficiently strong that these cost savings have ultimately been passed on to farmers and decision
makers throughout the system.  
This paper describes the salient features of the U.S. grain handling and transport system,
as well as its evolution over time.  Several major questions are addressed: what is the current U.S.
grain handling and transportation system, how did it evolve, and what are its characteristics? 
Section 2 describes salient elements of the system.  Section 3 describes the evolution of key
features of the system since 1980 including the role of changes in regulations. Sections 3 to 5
describe details of various mechanisms that have evolved to be important.  Section 6 provides a
summary model to depict the rationalization process in the U.S. system.  The final section
provides a summary and chronology of changes, and identifies some of the major features leading
to greater efficiency in the U.S. grain handling sector that are relevant for review of the Canadian
system.
Basic Elements of the U.S. Grain Handling and Transport System
Important elements of the U.S. grain handling and transportation system are shown in
Figure 1.  The U.S. system shows similarities with other systems, in terms of physical handling
and commodity flows.  It includes storage and handling functions throughout the system, car
allocation and shipping, export handling and logistics management throughout the system.  The
escalation of rail shipping options is of particular relevance to this paper.  Prior to deregulation
rail shipping options were limited primarily to single car movements with generic service2
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Figure 1. U.S. Grain Handling and Transport System
options.  Since then there has been an increase in the number of shipment size options, as well as 
service options, each with associated price differentials that approximately reflect cost differences. 
There are some critical features of the U.S. system that have evolved to a fairly high degree
of sophistication.  One is the role of price signals and service competition throughout the system to
coordinate the vertical marketing functions and to guide marketing and investment decisions.  This
occurs throughout all elements of the marketing system.  Price signals have always played an
important role in fundamental storage decisions (i.e., timing of marketing 1These roles and functions have since been replaced by the Surface Transportation Board (STB).
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decisions are influenced by intermonth price spreads).  In addition, on and off-farm storage
decisions are affected by competition.  Off-farm storage occurs if  it is more efficient than on-farm
storage, and to accommodate logistical requirements (i.e., accumulating grain for larger scale
shipment).  These competitive pressures prevail throughout the system and assure efficiencies.  
The system of price signals determining storage decisions has  always been a salient feature
of the marketing system.  In the past two decades other forms of price signals have emerged
specifically related to transport decisions. Through competitive pressures price discounts have
induced development of larger scale elevators and shipments, and have provided incentives for
farmers to deliver to further distant origins.  More recently, other signals have begun to emerge in
the rail sector, notably price differentials reflected in the rail car market, which are transmitted back
to grain handlers, shippers and farmers.   In Figure 1, these affect the choice of shipment size, as
well as the service option (a,b,c...) chosen.  Indeed, these signals influence storage decisions, the
timing of shipping decisions, as well as investment decisions in rail cars and infrastructure.  
A second important distinction is the definition of the shipper.  Prior to deregulation, 
whether the originator or receiver (in both cases being grain companies) was the shipper was not a
very important issue.  The reason for this was that shipping and service options were nonexistent.
making the distinction unimportant.  However, with the increase in the number of service and
shipping options, which are pursued differently by market participants as part of their longer-term
strategies, who (originator, receiver, or intermediary) is the shipper to a transaction is critical. 
Fundamentally, the firm that assumes the risks associated with logistics management is the shipper
and held accountable to the railroads and other parties to the transaction.         
Staggers Rail Act: Critical Provisions
Many of the changes that occurred in the U.S. grain marketing system were concurrent
with the Staggers Rail Act (SRA) of 1980.   The SRA also introduced important changes in the
regulatory regime regarding overall rate levels.   A number of these have had important effects on
the grain shipping and handling industry.  Each is discussed below along with, where appropriate,
the pre-SRA institutional environment. 
Rate Regulation: Captive Shippers, Market Dominance and the SRA Prior to the mid
1970's rates were regulated under the Interstate Commerce Act.  Beginning with the 4R Act of
1976 an evolution began toward greater rate flexibility, and less rigid regulation, but providing a
mechanism for protection for shippers.  
The SRA imposes two tests that must be met before the ICC and now the STB
1 would
have jurisdiction to regulate rate levels.  The first is the revenue to variable cost ratio (R/VC)2In 1984 that threshold was 1.80 but now depends on the extent the railroad is earning an adequate return. 
3See Tye for an economic interpretation of these concepts. 
4 See Market Dominance Determinations, 365 ICC 118 (1981).
5Currently, there is an STB proceeding considering elimination of geographic and product competition
from market dominance determination.




2   Specifically, if the R/VC is less than the threshold the ICC would not have jurisdiction
to regulate rates in that movement.  If  R/VC exceeds the threshold,  the ICC may have
jurisdiction.  However, simply because the R/VC exceeds the threshold does not necessarily mean
the shipper is captive.   
The second test is a finding of market dominance in the relevant market.  This is defined by
the ICC as “an absence of effective competition from other carriers or modes of transportation for
the transportation to which a rate applies” (49 § U.S.Gc. 10701a(b))1) (Supp.IV 1980) and is 
intended to be a test or screening device for rate reasonableness.  Guidelines have evolved to allow
for evidence of direct competition including inter and intramodal, as well as two forms of indirect
competition, product and geographic.
3  Based on these, if the carrier is found to be market
dominant, the shippers could be defined as “captive”
4 and then the STB would have jurisdiction to
regulate the rate.  It is important that these are more than administrative criteria and are now
evaluated in the context of competitive markets considering inter and intra modal, as well as
product and geographic effects.  The SRA also transferred the burden of proof for maximum rates
to shippers.  Before the 4R Act, carriers had to prove only that a rate was below the ICC’s
prescribed percentage of R/VC, in order to justify an increase.
5
Rate reasonableness cases are evaluated on a case by case basis.  There have been few
cases in which rate levels have been appealed under these criteria.  Most notable and relevant here
is the McCarty Farms shipping case.
6  Briefly, that case has had several rulings since it was
originally filed in 1978.  In 1987, the ICC ruled that the Burlington Northern was dominant in
wheat and barley shipments to the Pacific Northwest and that the shippers were captive.  However,
the most recent ruling (August 14, 1997) indicated these contested rates were not unreasonable
and did not exceed the maximum reasonable level.  This decision was based on the constrained
market approach and standalone costing procedures. 
While rate increases have been a major concern for shippers, most of these concerns have
been unfounded.  In fact, several studies have indicated that as a result of deregulation, cost
savings have accrued and rail rates have fallen in real terms.  Wilson (1997, p. 23) found that “the
effects of deregulation on costs and productivity gains are tremendous, with costs in 1989
estimated to be 40 percent lower under partial deregulation than they would be under a regulated
regime.”   In a related study focused on rail pricing, (Wilson 1994, p. 20) found that though there7Summary information about contract terms were filed by the carrier with the ICC.  This information was
fairly general and was publicly disseminated including information about railroad, commodity, general origins and
destinations, number of cars, type of movement, base tariff rate, any special features and the minimum annual
volume.
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were some initial increases in rates following deregulation (1980), by 1988  “deregulation
produced lower prices in most commodity classifications and did not increase prices in other
classifications, suggesting that advances on productivity have dominated any adverse market
power effects.”  
 Rate Changes Were Liberalized  Prior to 1980 rate changes required a 90 day notice for
increases and there were fairly liberal procedures to challenge proposed changes.  The net effect
was that rates were largely rigid and changes were introduced only infrequently.  Proposed
changes were typically subject to a very long notice about the rate increase. As a result shippers
had little risk related to rate changes.
The SRA changed the dynamics of rate changes.  Specifically, rate increases (decreases)
required a 20(1) day notice.  The effect was to allow greater flexibility for railroads to respond to
market conditions, but the exposure of shippers to increases in rail rates also increased.
Contracts Contract shipments were an important feature of the service environment during
the 1980s.  In addition, some of the evolving contract terms likely influenced the pricing and car
allocation practices that subsequently evolved.  
Contract rates were widely used in the Untied Sates in the first years following the SRA. 
The SRA explicitly encouraged carriers and shippers to enter into confidential contracts for grain
shipments subject to informational disclosure.
7  Shippers could challenge contract rates on grounds
of competitive harm or impairment of common carrier obligation.  In addition, the SRA allowed
agricultural shippers to challenge contract rates on grounds of the carrier’s refusal to offer similar
terms to them (which would constitute unreasonable discrimination). The legal process to
intervene required that the complainant must first demonstrate their case and that the dispute
cannot be resolved otherwise.   
Railroads were restricted in the portion of capacity allocated to contract carriage.  In
general, a carrier could allocate no more than 40% of its own fleet (for a particular car type) to
service under contracts.  However, the restriction was more specific for large agricultural shippers
(i.e., those originating more than 1000 cars per year).  A railroad could allocate no more than 40%
of the average annual number of rail-owned and private cars supplied to the shipper during the
previous three years.  
Contracts were generally opposed by small shippers, grain brokers, and farm groups. 
Reasons for this opposition included: their feeling they had little bargaining power; feelings that
contract rates created price uncertainty by obscuring traditional basis pricing system tied to tariff
rates; and that contract summaries were vague and provided little useful information. In response8Conrail privatization Act of 1986.
9 In 1929, major U.S. railroads originated 1.339 billion tons of freight with 229,530 miles of road. In
1992, Class I carriers originated approximately the same tonnage (1.339 billion tons of freight) with only 113,056
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to public pressure, Congress called for more liberal discovery provisions and added several
additional disclosure requirements.
8  In addition, the ICC added some specific disclosure
requirements for agricultural traffic including shipper identity, specific origins and destinations, and
actual volumes.  The ICC also eliminated the injury and need-to-know criteria for the second phase
of discovery.
Railroads approached contracting differently.  An important distinction evolved among two
important grain originating carriers in the upper Midwest.  In the early 1980s the BN’s customer
focus for contracting was on the receiver or intermediary (i.e., traders), while the Soo Line’s was
primarily on country elevators and processors.  Grain contracting peaked for the BN in 1986 and
for the Soo Line in 1985, and declined rapidly thereafter due in part to the more liberal discovery
rules and disclosure requirements.  By the late 1980s, both railroads stated their intention not to
enter into new grain contracts.  Essentially, the contracting process was replaced by more
comprehensive systems of service and car allocation (described below).   It is important that these
observations, though generally consistent, are not as pervasive for grain terminating railroads or
for grain product shipments.   
Premium Rates for Premium Service One of the important features of the SRA was a
clause to allow railroads to charge premium rates for premium service.  Specifically, Congress
stated that “rail carriers shall be permitted to establish tariffs containing premium charges for
special services for specific levels of services not provided in any tariff otherwise applicable to the
movement” (Section 10734 of Title 49, United States Code).  As a result of this provision,
railroads actively pursued market-driven allocation mechanisms, in addition to addressing shippers’
complaints of car availability and to foster productively gains.  This eventually proved to be
important because it is one of the clauses that facilitated development of more elaborate
guaranteed forward shipping mechanisms and service competition (see below).   
Branch Line Abandonment  The Staggers Rail Act created liberalized procedures for
branch line abandonment.  As a result of this process branch line abandonment was expedited
beginning in 1980.   In the period since 1980, 19.9% of the rail lines were abandoned in Region 3,
the region including the upper Midwestern states.  In Montana, 29% of the Class I and II rail lines
were abandoned.  Only 13.5% were abandoned in North Dakota, likely due to the geographic
scope of railroad competition in key regions of branch line concentrations.  In addition, a portion
of the rail lines were converted to short line railroads and operated independently of the Class I
carriers (see Section 5).
This escalation of track abandonment is merely an extension of longer-term trends.  Since
the early 1900's, the Class I railroad network in the United States has been shrinking, while the
overall traffic base has remained relatively constant.
9  Concentration of traffic on fewer miles ofmiles of road. Over the same period, the traffic density of the Class I railroad network (as measured in revenue ton-
miles per mile) increased from 1.95 million to 9.436 million, while the average length of haul increased from 334
to 762 miles.
10Numerous forms of rate discounts have evolved in the U.S. rail system. It is critical that any comparison
of rates over time, as well as between U.S. and Canadian regions account for the cumulative effects of these
discounts.
11The terminology is distinguished from innovations explicitly introduced in the summer of 1997 referred
to as Origin-Efficiency and Destination-Efficiency programs on the BNSF.  These are clarified in a later section.  
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road, in conjunction with longer hauls, greater car capacity, and other gains in operational
efficiency has had a profound effect on railroad productivity. Net ton-miles per train hour (a single-
factor measure of productivity) increased by 519 percent during this period.
Rail Incentive Mechanisms
The evolution of the rail incentive mechanisms has been crucial to the changes that have
occurred in the grain handling and transportation industry.  Differentials implied in these
mechanisms reflect economies of rail operations and are passed on in the form of rate discounts. In
the process these rate discounts provide incentives to induce more efficient grain handling and
shipping practices.  
The grain rate structure has evolved to include trainload, single and multiple-origin rates, as
well as programs to enhance efficiencies in the total movement --commonly called origin-
destination efficiency programs.  Each of these are very important features that affect rate spreads,
providing differentiation and incentives among rail service levels.  These are not necessarily an
outgrowth of the SRA, and in fact could have been and in some cases were introduced prior to the
SRA.  These are described in this section and the most important features of the BN and CP/Soo
rate structures are highlighted.  These include: 1) origin efficiency,  or,  trainload rates; 2) origin-
destination efficiency programs; 3) per car rates; and 4) rates and requirements for shipments in
higher-cube (286,000 lb) covered hopper cars.
10               
  
   Origin-Efficiency Incentives
11 In the 1970's, the BN and UP introduced trainload rates
from Kansas and Nebraska to the Pacific Northwest (PNW). At the request of northern plain
shippers, the BN introduced similar rates in North Dakota and Montana in late 1979.  Over time
there has been an evolution in these rate differentials from allowing both multiple and single origin
incentives, to now only providing incentives for single-origin movements.  This evolution is
described below. 
Multiple Origin Unit Train Rates: BN’s early rate structure included four elements: a 52-
car“unit train” rate, a 26-car single-origin rate, a 26-car multiple-origin rate and a single-car rate.
The purpose of the multiple-origin rate was to allow branch-line shippers with smaller facilities and
limited siding to gain part of the benefits of multiple-car rates, and at the same time, provide an12In some instances, the 26-car multiple-origin rates were replaced by 3-, 5-, or 10-car rates to
Minneapolis and Duluth.
13Similar concepts and spread were introduced for other small grains.  
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incentive for branch-line shippers to upgrade their facilities and become single-origin multi-car
stations. Initially, the BN allowed as many as four elevators to pool a 26-car shipment. However,
the 26-car multiple-origin rates were abandoned from BN’s rate structure around 1985.
12
Multiple-origin rates seemed to have fallen into disfavor with the BN for two primary
reasons: (1) efficiency and (2) the mitigating effect on rate spread incentives.    Simply, multiple-
origination of grain movements is less efficient than single-origin from an operational perspective
(a fact exemplified by the Soo Line surcharge of $150 per car). Multiple-origin shipments require
the switching of several small blocks of cars at 2, 3, or 4 stations as opposed to the switching of
one large block of cars at a single station. Switching inefficiencies are compounded when both the
loaded and empty switches are considered. In addition, several waybills must be prepared and
processed for a multiple-origin shipment (instead of just one).   
The approach of the CP/Soo was somewhat different.  Initially, more alternatives were
allowed to shippers.  As recently as 1995, the Soo Line published multiple-origin wheat rates to
Washington and Oregon.  That rate allowed as many as four shippers to pool the consignment; but
they must be located in the same tariff pooling group in order to quality.  The Soo Line also had a
52-car rate which allowed two adjacent shippers to pool a consignment.  In either case, shippers
incurred a $150/car charge in addition to the regular 26-car or 52-car rate. 
The effect of these rates was to collapse the incentive implied in the rate spread.  As
example, in 1995,  the spreads among the 1- and 25-car rates and the 25- and 50-car rates without
multiple-origin rates were approximately $307 per car.  Under multiple-origin service, the rate
spreads were effectively reduced to $150 per car.  If  a smaller Soo Line elevator could load 25
cars with one switch (but cannot handle 50 cars), the elevator would be at a 9 cent per bushel rate
disadvantage relative to a single-origin trainload shipper. Alternatively, if the same elevator can
pool a 50-car consignment with an adjacent facility, then its rate disadvantage drops to 4.5 cents
per bushel. 
Single Origin Unit Train Rates:  Multi-car/single origin rates were adopted later and
proliferated to include 1-,3-,5-,10-,26- and 52-car incentives in the case of wheat.  However, the
most recent tariffs have reduced the categories to 3 as shown in Table 1.
There are several important addendums to these rate differentials
13.
• The rate spreads shown are for the portion of the movement to Minneapolis.  In
addition, to some destinations (but not all) beyond, additional rate discounts exist for
larger trains--though these are very market specific and responsive to market and
competitive conditions.  14  Both the UP and BN are “tweaking incentive policies to encourage efficiency”... in the form of larger
scale movements.  In Kansas and Oklahoma where these incentives already exist, discounts relative to 1-car
movements are $400/car, an additional $100/car relative to 52-car trains.  There is debate in industry as to whether
these types of movements will come to dominate the trade  (AgWeek p. 2A, Sept., 8, 1997). 
9
Table 1. Rail Rate Discounts for Single Origin Movements from North Dakota
Number of Cars Originated
26-51 versus 1 52-110 versus 1
BN to Minneapolis/Duluth  $255/car (8c/b) $425/car (13c/b)
BN to Pacific Northwest  $207/car(6.3c/b) $415/car(13c/b)
25 versus 1 50 versus 1 75 versus 1
CP/Soo* to Minneapolis/Duluth $256/car
 (8c/b)
$426/car (13c/b) NA






 *Spreads apply to the movement in standard hopper cars.  Comparable spreads exist for shipment in higher
capacity (e.g., hi-cube, 286,000 lb) cars.
 
• Differences among these, as well as the absolute value, are largely reflective of the
railroad’s marginal cost differences.  The fact that they differ among corridors and
railroads reflect that their operating economies vary in these dimensions.
• As recently as 1995, the westbound Soo Line wheat rate structure consisted of five
elements:  a single-car rate, a 25-car multiple-origin rate, a 25-car single-origin rate, a
50-car two-origin rate, and a 50-car single-origin rate.  
• The Soo Line rates to Minneapolis, Duluth and Glenwood, MN included a five-car rate. 
However, these have since been abandoned.
The trend is currently toward adoption of larger scale incentives for shipments up to 108
cars.
14  However, it appears this is selectively being combined with a broader class of incentives
called origin-destination efficiency programs which are discussed below.15However shuttle types of  trains have been used for coal since the 1960s.
16The tariff version of the ODE (Item 12167) was canceled in September 1995.  
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Cycles, Shuttles and Origin-Destination Efficiency (ODE) Programs
Origin-Destination Efficiency (ODE) types of programs were  introduced for grain in
1993
15 to “promote efficient car utilization, customer logistics, and quality accounting.”  At that
time the BN introduced  two programs: a West Coast item applicable to export corn, sorghum and
soybean movements and a St. Louis program applicable on spring wheat, durum and barley. 
Important requirements of that west coast program were:
• Shipment unit was for 108 cars (consisting of two 54-car units) loaded at two stations,
both of which are included in the same operating group.
• All 108 cars must terminate at a single destination (elevator).
• Each unit must be loaded and unloaded within 16 hours of constructive placement.
• Only guaranteed freight cars can be used.
• Only elevators served directly by BN at Tacoma, Seattle, Kalama, Portland or
Vancouver, WA, are eligible as destinations.
• $200 discount per car.
The St. Louis program was primarily targeted at encouraging efficiency in the movement of
northern grains to the Mississippi River for barge transfer.  It allowed adjacent stations to pool two
52- or 55-car consignments to form a 104- or 110-car train. Again, shippers received a $200 per
car discount.
Since their inception, wide-scale adoption of these mechanisms has been hampered by
market conditions. Following their initial offering these programs vacillated and in 1997 evolved in
the form of contract programs (e.g., commonly called the XLP program on the BN).
16 Given that
these are under contract the exact terms are not transparent, but industry contacts suggest they
were similar in format to the above:
• 100+ cars loaded at 1 or 2 stations within 24 hours;
• Power remains attached for the complete movement;
• All cars unloaded at a single destination (consignee) in 24 hours;
• Some form of a guaranteed shipping mechanism (COTS, SWAPS) is required.
• Rate discount is $300/car ($200/car) for single (2) origin shipments respectively relative
to the 52-car tariff rate.
The CP/Soo offered a complementary program for part of this period, but it has since been
suspended.  The UP has a similar program called the Contracted Shuttle Train Program which it
operates as a component of its broader set of service options.17At least in the offering the BNSF did not indicate whether the movement required the shipper to have
guaranteed cars to effectuate the shipment.
18These were introduced in tariff (Items 12604 and 12605)
19 In 1995 the BN westbound 52-car rates allowed the shipment to be broken into two 26-car blocks at
destination (with a single switch) and delivered to two consignees, provided both blocks are consigned under one
waybill. The second 52-car rate is the traditional single-origin, single-destination rate--shippers get a $100 per car
reduction by consigning the entire shipment to one consignee
20Milling and Baking News, Sept. 30, 1997, p. 19.
21Milling and Baking News, Sept. 19, 1997 p. 15. 
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Railroads have continued to expand and offer these incentive programs.  In September
1997 the BNSF introduced 104 ODE type train shipments on wheat from the upper Midwest.  This
movement would be under contract and require 104 cars loaded at one origin station with a single
placement and unloaded at a single destination elevator.  The offering prescribed the origin and
destination elevators at which the program could apply (presumably specifying those with the
technical capabilities of meeting the shipment requirements).  The rate discount for this movement
is $150/car off the 52-car rate.
17  
The BNSF also introduced a variant of these programs for corn, soybeans and milo under
tariff to induce efficiencies in origination and termination during the summer of 1997.
18  These
provided $100 discount each at origin and destination if certain requirements were achieved,
including electronic data interchange (EDI) and certified weights at origin.  More recently
(September 1997, Item 12230) the BNSF indicated that to qualify for 52-car or more unit train
discounts, the shipment would only be allowed one initial placement at the destination industry
(Item 12230)--thus encouraging more efficient movements from single origins to single
destinations (i.e., industry plant at the destination market).
19  Further refinements to the program
were introduced during the summer of 1998.
Each of these programs was developed as a further step in the process of trying to improve
rail efficiency.  An important underlying impetus is that the cycle time for grain cars is far greater
than for other types of movements.  The BNSF cited the average cycle time of coal trains at 5.3
days, versus wheat trains at 19 days.
20  In reference to the UP approach to these mechanisms,
Collier noted it “... is part of our ongoing strategy to reward the productivity of individual facilities
through our rate structures”
21   The mechanisms provide incentives for improving the total
movement including origination, termination and thus rail cycle time.  Other major railroads have
since implemented similar programs, though in many cases the terms remain under contract. 
However, railroad and receiver logistics have an important impact on the commercial viability of
these mechanisms, resulting in their being used only in selective corridors.
  
Per Car Rates  An important innovation in administration of rail shipments and providing
additional incentives was the adoption of per car rates.  Prior to the late 1980's virtually all rail
grain rates in the Upper Midwest were on a per unit of volume basis (e.g., per bushel or cwt.). 22The Soo Line envisions upgrading most or all of its system to a minimum of  90-lb continuous welded
rail (the minimum desirable standard for at least 25 mph operations with heavy cars). In the interim, heavy car
speeds may be restricted on very light rail.
12
The effect of this was neutral with respect to fully-loading rail cars and at least a portion of the
grain cars were less than fully loaded.  
The effect of per car rates was to fully encourage handlers to load cars to their (either car
or track) capacity--or vice versa, provide them disincentives for under loading of cars.   In
addition, accounting and billing were simplified.  
111 ton Cars  Since 1990, railroads have begun acquiring larger C6X covered hopper cars
which have a 286,000 lb. gross weight limit. On average, shippers can load approximately 11 more
tons in a C6X than in a regular C6 covered hopper car.  The CP/Soo also has procured a large
volume of high-cube cars, and apparently comprises up to 50 percent of their fleet.  These
cars are handled under different tariff provisions, and incur a different rate.  Rate differences
between C6 and C6X cars are normally simply a multiple of each other (i.e., 1.07 times the C6
rate).  The unit train differentials are similar.  
Because of the efficiencies associated with using these cars, each railroad controls their
allocation, ultimately to make them fully utilized and retained as units.  The BN has specific
procedures for requesting C6X cars.  In order to participate in the Soo Line program, shippers
must request authorization for a maximum of 100 cars two months in advance. At least 15 days
before the want date, the shipper must place an order for delivery of the cars, at which time
authorization becomes official. The Soo Line reserves the right to restrict authorization to lines
capable of handling the heavier cars.
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Car Allocation Systems:  The Evolution of Service Competition
One of the important areas of competition that has evolved since 1987 is that of car
allocation and service options.  These have changed radically during the past few years and have
had important implications for the grain handling and shipping industries.  These are described
briefly.
Background  Traditionally, rail car allocation was generally on a “first-order-first-serve”
basis.  Uncertainties in rail car availability and lack of penalties for car cancellations facilitated
persistent over ordering and a phenomenon known as “phantom orders”--car demands inflated in
the form of orders, and subsequently canceled.  An important result was that both shippers and
railroads were confronted with uncertainties--shippers with respect to timely receipt of cars, and
railroads with respect to certainty of future demand.  Due to a multitude of market and 
competitive pressures, the BN railroad, an innovator in this area, developed explicit car allocation
and service mechanisms.   These have evolved to encompass a system of mechanisms including23See Wilson and Priewe for a detailed description of these mechanisms for each of the Class I railroads in
the United States. Priewe and Wilson analyze the economics of shipping strategies using these mechanisms.   
24These were originally commonly referred to as SWAPS and are now referred to as Guarantees.
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shorter term guarantees, longer-term guarantees and more refined procedures for allocation of
general car orders.
Similar mechanisms have been developed and adopted by virtually all the other major Class
I railroads in the grain industry.  For purposes of illustration, the following describes the BNSF
system.
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BNSF Car Allocation System   The car allocation mechanisms on the BNSF comprise a
system of logistical choices for shippers.  General tariff, Certificate of Transport (COTs), and
SWAPS
24 offer shippers a continuum of logistical choices from which to develop rail shipping and
grain merchandising strategies.  Various degrees of forward commitment, transferability, rate
uncertainty, and performance incentives exist in this car allocation system.  It is incumbent on
shippers to select the best option, or combination of options, that best meets their needs.  Salient
features of these programs and how they relate under current offerings are shown in Table 2.    
Each of the major Class I railroads have adopted systems with similar mechanisms.  These
result in more choices for shippers and a more logically consistent and efficient system of car
allocation.  Most grain car allocation systems comprise three mechanisms to allocate cars: 1) 
general tariff shipments; 2) shipments subject to short-term guarantees (e.g., COTS, PERX); and
3)  longer-term guarantees (e.g., SWAPS, GEEPS).  The development of these programs
represents an effort to promote efficiency and improve service in the grain sector of rail
transportation. 
Allocation methods for general tariff service have been redesigned to discourage persistent
over ordering and eliminate the need for shippers to be first in line. Carriers have approached this
in varying ways.  In general these have resulted in improved efficiency and fairness of car
allocation for general tariff shipments.  Common features of shorter term guarantee programs
include: forward order period and carrier performance guarantees, a bidding process,
transferability and shipper cancellation penalties.  Programs differ among carriers on these features. 
However,  all major programs generally permit the grain shipper to secure rail capacity for short-
term shipping periods--at a premium charge during some periods. 
Longer-term guarantee programs promote greater efficiency and provide a mechanism of
risk sharing between shippers and carriers.  An important motive for these programs is that
management of private railcar fleets by rail carriers, normally in the form of a pool,  results in
efficiency gains.  In addition, carriers are able to expand fleet size while offering logistically
differentiated services to shipping customers.  Longer-term guarantee programs provide incentives
to level out shipping patterns and extreme seasonal swings in grain movements (Priewe and 14
Table 2.  Allocation System: Key Elements
Item General Tariff COT SWAPS
Fleet Allocation
(Estimates)
35 - 40 percent 30 - 35 percent 30 - 35 percent
Corridor/District
Allocation




Instrument Tariff Tariff Private Contract
Type of Guarantee None Short-term Long-term
Allocation to Individual
Shippers
Each unit train origin
assured one train per





Forward Order Period 1 month Up to 6 months Monthly shipments for
varying periods
forward




Cancellation Penalties $200/car Prepayment - $300 per
car plus premium
$250
Rate Level Tariff at time of
shipment.
Option of shipper. Bid
or effective tariff at
time of shipment.





* This is critical because it has been incorrectly described in numerous explanations of the mechanism.  Cars
are allocated to each geographic district based on historical shipments.  Each unit train origin is allocated one
train per month and is effectuated by an order.  Only in the case that the number of orders exceeds cars
available for that month is the random process used for allocation.  
Wilson 1997).  Shippers receive guaranteed services and rail carriers benefit from more predictable
movements.  Transferability is also important and facilitates secondary market transactions.
Implications for Shippers These mechanisms have a number of important implications for
grain firms.  Most important is that it becomes critical to integrate logistics, grain merchandising
and handling decisions. Firms with greater control over inventories and/or forward sales
(processing demand) will have a greater ability to utilize these mechanisms, the effect being to
minimize the summation of car cancellations, and inventory and storage costs and demurrage.
As a result of these changes, most grain handling firms have re-organized and integrated
their trading and logistics functions for purposes of enhancing logistical efficiency.  For purposes15
here, logistical efficiency refers to having the right grain in the right place at the right time, and in
the process, minimizing inventory and storage costs, and penalties associated with car cancellation
and late shipments.  Some of the important implications to grain firms associated with adopting of
these mechanics include:  
• Coordination of logistic and merchandising becomes critical
• Firms that have advantages with these programs are multi-plant firms (so long as origin
transferability is allowed), processors, or any firm with certainty about forward needs. 
But potential bargaining power of large firms is mitigated.
• Strategic implications of forward coverage becomes important:  Prior to the advent of
these mechanisms, if a shortage emerged it was perceived that all were treated equally.
• Information emanating from primary and secondary transactions in these mechanisms
improves forward decision making of both carriers (in equipment planning and
allocation)  and shippers (regarding the timing of forward marketing decisions).
• Mechanism operations have become highly transparent
• Identification of the shipper in grain transactions becomes critical (i.e., who is the
shipper)--generally the shipper is the party to the transaction, (either the originator,
receiver, or intermediary),  having the prerogative to manage risks and car strategies. 
In the U.S. this has become an important negotiable term in grain transactions.   
• Accountability between carrier and shipper become critical--the carrier offering
guarantees about a portion of their forward car allocations, and shippers about the
obligation of fulfilling orders with actual shipments. 
Factors Contributing to Rationalization and Efficiency of the U.S. Grain Handling and
Transportation System
The U.S. grain handling and transportation industry has already experienced a fairly
radical rationalization process which continues to evolve.  Numerous pressures were exerted on
this system over the past two decades, which has resulted in improved efficiency in the overall
system.  A model of that rationalization process is depicted in Figure 2.  16
Figure 2.  U.S. Grain Industry Rationalization
Numerous pressures have given rise to the rationalization process.  These include various 
railroad tactics, competition in the grain handling sector and external factors.  Each of the railroad
tactics shown in Figure 2 was discussed previously with exception of Short Lines (see below).  It is
important that the rationalization process is more complex than simply the unit train rates that
provide incentives for larger scale movements.  Each of the other railroad tactics have also
contributed to a more rationalized system.  
Other contributing factors include the competitive environment among handlers. 
Differentials (in the form of rate discounts) emerge to provide incentives for shippers to adopt
more efficient shipping technologies and practices.  However,  the value of these to the
shipper/handler lasts only until competitors adopt similar technologies.  Thus, it is the highly
competitive environment among handlers that results in the rapidity of adoption of more efficient
shipping practices.25Several studies of short line railroads in the northern plains region have found significant economies of
branch line operations. In particular, three case studies conducted in ND in the late 1980's illustrated the relative
economics of the two modes of branch line operation. The first case represents a stand-alone branch line operation;
i.e. a short line railroad operating a single branch line and interlining with the existing Class I railroad. Logic
suggests that because of the start-up (threshold) costs of running a business, stand-alone short line systems
consisting of a single branch line may not be profitable. The results of the case study (which simulated operation of
an 81-mile line with nine cars per mile) support this conclusion showing a 20 percent increase in cost from short
line operations (assuming the short line practices normal maintenance). The other two case studies were of a
regional network consisting of 667 miles of road (with an average density of 20 cars per mile) and a short line
network of 211 miles (with 36 cars per mile). Both simulations yielded positive efficiencies. Cost savings of 36
percent and 31 percent were projected for the regional and short line networks, respectively. A more generalized
study found that (on average) short line operations reduced on-branch costs by 24 percent per car.  See Thoms,
Dooley and Tolliver for a summary.
17
Finally, there were several forces external to the grain industry that had the effect of
inducing a more rationalized system.  Notable among these were the U.S. set aside programs (ARP
and CRP) which played very crucial roles during the mid-1980s, having the effect of reducing
shipping and handling demand.  Decreased demand reduced margins and induced firms to adopt
more efficient shipping practices and consolidation.  In addition, during some of the 1980s an
important component of elevator income was from storing government-owned grain.  Once that
was liquidated through various mechanisms during the later 1980s and early 1990s, some facilities
began to experience financial difficulties and the rate of plant closures accelerated.  
Short Line Railroads An important feature of railroad cost savings was the adoption of
short-line shipping technology. Since 1980, over 250 new short line or regional railroads have been
formed in the U.S., most as a result of Class I carrier sales.  Much of these efficiencies
25  relate to
fewer employees per mile and per carload. However, lower wage scales with profit-sharing plans,
smaller train crews, few, if any, work rules, and employee flexibility are all important factors in
operational efficiency.  An early study reported that labor costs decreased by 75% versus Class I
railroads on comparable movements (Thoms, Dooley and Tolliver).  Furthermore, short line
railroads are able to purchase and more effectively utilize older power.  Two operational
characteristics of short line railroads facilitate their use of older power units. First, they operate at
slower speeds than Class I carriers (frequently at 10 miles per hour). Second, short line railroads
do not continuously utilize their power, frequently shutting units off at night.
Lower train speeds help to reduce costs in other ways.  Low train speeds reduce the
probability of derailment. In fact, lower train speeds allow short lines to perform minimal track
maintenance without incurring heavy casualty and insurance costs that would result from frequent
derailments. Short line carriers could not make this trade-off without crew flexibility and lower
labor costs. In essence, short lines can trade-off higher crew costs, resulting from lower speeds and
layovers, against lower track maintenance and power costs. Class I carriers cannot make these
tradeoffs; they must operate at higher speeds.18
Figure 3.  Dynamics of the Grain Rationalization Process
The expanded use of C6X cars may pose problems for short line railroads in the future.  If
branch lines or short line tracks have to be upgraded for C6X cars, or special permits cannot be
given to some shippers, then some shippers will achieve competitive advantage over others.
Efficiency and Rationalization The effect of these pressures has been an increase in
investment in the grain handling and transportation sector and a corresponding improvement in
efficiency.  This is characterized by a reduction in the number of elevators, and investments in
larger elevators in terms of storage, rail siding and load-out capacity.  In addition, there has been
an escalated rate of investment in grain rail cars. 
Throughout the grain marketing system there are important economies resulting in lower
unit costs associated with larger scale shipment.  Costs have been reduced throughout the system
in part due to these economies, and in part due to increased logistical efficiency.  
Time Paths of the Rationalization Process  The U.S. experience leads to the conclusion
that the time path of the rationalization process is affected by several important factors.  These are
summarized in Figure 3.  Early in the rationalization process the mechanisms and competitive and
market pressures resulted in fairly wide-scale adoption of more efficient shipping and 
 handling practices.  Later, due to competitive pressures there has been an escalation in mergers
and consolidation.  However, each firm, being larger, is better capable of exploiting economies
resulting in cost savings.     26For here it is important that there are two elements of efficiency: pricing efficiency and distributional
efficiency. Wilson analyzes the efficiency of car allocation mechanisms.  
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The rationalization of the U.S. grain handling system continues to evolve and in recent
years is being further dominated by mechanisms to induce greater logistical efficiency.  These
include destination types of efficiency mechanisms to further induce greater efficiency of the total
system.  A second is to induce more efficient car allocation mechanisms.
26  
The U.S. grain handling system has evolved and will continue to do so in response to
technological and institutional changes, competitive pressures and a changed regulatory regime. 
The effect has been to induce investments throughout the system (for example, in rail siding,
loading/unloading capacities, rail car ownership, electronic interchange of data and information,
etc.) and innovations, and to improve efficiencies throughout the system.  In virtually all cases this
response has resulted in some form of cost reduction and efficiency gain. 
This section provides a summary of the evolution of changes and identifies some important
lessons that have been learned for the evolution of the Canadian grain handling and transportation
system.  Critical changes in the U.S. marketing system are identified first, followed by a discussion
of implications for the Canadian marketing system.  
Critical Rail Initiatives:   There have been a multitude of changes in the U.S. system,
particularly with respect to rail initiatives.  For summary purposes, Table 3 describes the
approximate evolution of these mechanisms, and their effect on the industry.  
A number of points are important to the above evolution.  First,  rate discounts have played
an important role, though not exclusive,  in the evolution of the system.  U.S. railroads developed
rate structures that are increasingly differentiated in numerous dimensions.  In nearly all cases these
are characterized as follows: 1)  identification of rail operating efficiencies, 2) rate discounts are
developed to reflect operating cost differentials; and 3) rate discounts are conveyed to decision
makers.  These ultimately provide incentives to shippers about making capital expenditures, and/or
marketing decisions.  These discounts have evolved system wide and even in regions with only one
or two serving carriers.  
Second, the particular form in which the rate discounts and clauses have evolved is
suggestive of the type of efficiencies achievable by railroads.  It is critically important and very
clear that the U.S. has evolved from fairly disjointed movements characterized by multi-station
origination to multiple customers at one or more destination.  It is evolving rapidly toward a
system of single station origination to single placements at destinations, combined to reduce
switching costs and improve car cycle times.  Not all movements will conform to these20
Table 3. Stage of Rail Initiatives
Approximate Timing Initiative Effect
1976 & 1980 Changes in Regulatory
Regime
Part of subsequent changes
were triggered by selected
features of the regulatory
regime
mid-1970's‚mid-1980's Unit train discounts
introduced at origins; single
and multiple origin rates; and
many different sized
movements
Induced beginning of multicar
origination
late 1980's Per car rates replaced per
grain volume rates
Induced fully loaded (i.e., to
equipment capacity) cars
1990's Convergence toward single
origin and single destination
unit train incentives;  and
standardization of unit size
Further improvements in rail
and handling efficiency
1990's Adoption of higher-capacity
cars
Reduced costs per unit and
incentives conveyed to
handlers
1993 to current  Cycle, shuttles, ODEs and
destination incentives being
developed 
Induce efficiency on the total
movement including
destination efficiencies




reduced risks for both
shippers and carriers
requirements, however, those that can will receive incentives to do so, and if they offset the cost
differentials, these would ultimately prevail.  In all cases these at least offer shippers the option to
induce efficient rail movements.
Third, issues related to car allocation and service competition evolved to the point that
each of the major railroads have adopted systems comprising several mechanisms, giving shippers
logistical choices.  This has evolved so that identification of the shipper is essential.  Generally, the
shipper should be the bearer of risk in grain shipping and beneficiary of efficient logistical
management.  This is because of the bilateral nature of accountability that emerges between the
shipper and carrier as a result of these mechanisms.    21
Implications for Canada: As Canada seeks to understand issues related to the evolution of
its grain handling and transportation system, several issues emerge from the experience of
rationalization in the upper Midwest of the United States.  These can be grouped into three major
areas.
Regulatory Framework and Rate Flexibility: To accomplish what has been adopted in the
United States requires a regulatory framework which allows for some form of flexibility.  This
requires moving away from cost-based regulation. Flexibility in rate-making is important for at
least four reasons.  One is that temporal demand conditions are inevitably uncertain.  Second,
numerous shipping configurations can evolve which allow railroads to exploit economies that can
and should be reflected in rate discounts.  Third, there are several other dimensions of service
competition that can evolve but necessarily requires some form of more flexible rates.  Fourth, the
financial viability of Canadian railroads in a competitive environment depends on a more rational
distribution of costs among shipments.  If railroad costs are fixed at some arbitrary rate cap (e.g.,
fully allocated costs) railroads will inevitably be less responsive to changes in demand (both
random and seasonal) and shippers will be under served due to capacity restrictions.
In the United States, the regulatory framework facilitates flexibility to respond to demand
conditions,  efficiencies and service competition.  Protective mechanisms exist for shippers in  a
multitude of forms of direct (intermodal and intramodal) as well as indirect (product and
geographic) competitive pressures. In addition, there are explicit mechanisms within the regulatory
framework that provide protection for shippers.
System Efficiency, Integration and Coordination:  The United States system evolved from
a highly vertically disintegrated industry structure.  Grain flows in that system were largely
uncoordinated and resulted in frequent and random rationing and embargos at selected elevators. 
The system is evolving toward a system which is more structurally vertically integrated and
coordinated through more explicitly shipping tariff and contractual relationships.  In contrast, the
Canadian industry has the elements of being a highly vertically integrated system, but does not
necessarily function as a vertically coordinated and integrated system.
Numerous mechanisms exist and can be developed to exploit vertical system efficiencies. 
In general these involve use of rate differentials for different movement configurations, as well as
car allocation and service options.  Each of these is a natural area of service competition among
carriers and would likely be adopted system wide.  However, as became apparent in the United
States, use of these mechanisms requires more explicit designation of the shipper, as well as
accountability between shipper and carrier.  
Benefits to Farmers:  Many of the changes were induced in the United States because of
the railroad’s ability to identify and exploit operating efficiencies.  These resulted in increased rail
productivity and the reduced rail operating costs ultimately were passed on to shippers in the form
of rate discounts.  Combined with more efficient lower cost handling, the total marketing costs for
farmers are reduced.  In addition it is notable in the United States there is nearly always adequate
handling and shipping capacity, farmers are not restricted as to the timing of their sales, and there
has been private investment in rail cars which are generally available as needed.  22
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